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8	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT		
9	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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11	JAMES MICHAEL FAYED,	No. 2:21-CV-214	41-DMC-P
12	Plaintiff,		
13	v.	<u>ORDER</u>	
14	KATHLEEN ALLISON, et al.,		
15	Defendants.		
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17	Plaintiff, a prisoner proceeding pro se, brings this civil rights action pursuant to		
18	42 U.S.C. § 1983. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's second motion for the appointment of		
19	counsel, ECF No. 22.		
20	The United States Supreme Court has ruled that district courts lack authority to		
21	require counsel to represent indigent prisoners in § 1983 cases. See Mallard v. United States Dist.		
22	Court, 490 U.S. 296, 298 (1989). In certain exceptional circumstances, the court may request the		
23	voluntary assistance of counsel pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1). See Terrell v. Brewer, 935		
24	F.2d 1015, 1017 (9th Cir. 1991); Wood v. Housewright, 900 F.2d 1332, 1335-36 (9th Cir. 1990).		
25	A finding of "exceptional circumstances" requires an evaluation of both the likelihood of success		
26	on the merits and the ability of the plaintiff to articulate his claims on his own in light of the		
27	complexity of the legal issues involved. See Terrell, 935 F.2d at 1017. Neither factor is		
28	dispositive and both must be viewed together before reaching a decision. See id. In Terrell, the		
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1 Ninth Circuit concluded the district court did not abuse its discretion with respect to appointment 2 of counsel because: 3 ... Terrell demonstrated sufficient writing ability and legal knowledge to articulate his claim. The facts he alleged and the issues he raised were not 4 of substantial complexity. The compelling evidence against Terrell made it extremely unlikely that he would succeed on the merits. 5 Id. at 1017. 6 7 In the present case, the Court does not at this time find the required exceptional 8 circumstances. As with his previous motion, Plaintiff states that appointment of counsel is 9 warranted because: (1) he is indigent; (2) he has limited and inadequate prison law library access; 10 (3) his case has merit; and (4) the case will likely involve extensive and complicated discovery; 11 and (5) it is unfair to require him to proceed pro se against defendants who will have access to 12 experienced counsel. These circumstances are common among prisoners filing civil rights cases 13 and, thus, are not extraordinary. Furthermore, a review of Plaintiff's filings to date reflects an 14 adequate ability to articulate on his own. Finally, as to the merits, the Court has ordered Plaintiff 15 to file an amended complaint because it found Plaintiff's original claim deficient. The Court has 16 not yet addressed the sufficiency of Plaintiff's amended pleading. In any event, no defendant has 17 answered, and no evidence has been presented. It is thus impossible to say at this time that 18 Plaintiff has established a likelihood that he will succeed on the merits 19 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff's second motion for the 20 appointment of counsel, ECF No. 22, is denied. 21 22 Dated: March 9, 2022 23 DENNIS M. COTA UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 24 25 26 27

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